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The Biological Foundations of Global Ethics and law 
Abstract 
 
This article attempts to translate philosophical notions into biological terms in order to 
transform dualistic thinking into monistic thinking. What if ethics finds its cause in 
physical, molecular processes? In Ruling Passions Simon Blackburn acknowledges 
the biological fact that we are social animals and that we need to coordinate our 
efforts. Therein lies an opportunity for a fruitful discussion about the biological 
foundation of ethics. Although Blackburn thinks there cannot be a grand unifying 
theory or a single driving force that underlies ethics, the spreading of our genes may 
well be the key. As cooperation is the means by which humans have been 
successfully spreading their genes, ethics in some sense can be regarded as a 
biological or even a physical force. Recognition of ethics as such a force can help 
overcome false dichotomies in contemporary ethics and law. Four natural laws of 
global ethics and law can be formulated on the basis of factual biological 
mechanisms – natural laws that have remarkable equivalents in religion and 
contemporary law. 
 
Hendrik Gommer, Groningen (Netherlands) 




A biological theory of ethics and law can feel threatening; exploring the biological 
foundations of ethics can cause virtues to lose their enchantment. While Simon 
Blackburn acknowledges that such a theory may be true, regardless of whether we 
like it, he insists that the natural world is revealed by the senses and that neither ‘they 
nor the sciences seem to be good detectors of obligations, duties, or the order of 
value of things. As everyone knows, nature is heartless’.1 That is why, according to 
Blackburn, for the naturalist that refuses any appeal to a supernatural order the 
problem is one of ‘placing ethics within the disenchanted, non-ethical order’.2 What is 
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ethics? It is defined by its practical role. It guides our actions and puts pressure on 
our choices. Ethics is shown in how we behave or say how we ought to behave.3  
But what if nature is not ‘heartless’, not ‘disenchanted’? What if nature not only 
tells us that we behave in a certain way but also tells us, directly or indirectly, how we 
ought to behave? What if nature tells us whom to punish or to admire? Blackburn 
asserts there is consensus amongst philosophers that people recognize things go 
better when they cooperate.4 But if nature is not responsible for our urge to 
cooperate, then what is?5 To prescribe that people ought to cooperate, some 
philosophers think it necessary to introduce a social contract,6 others invoke reason,7 
some sociologists will refer to society,8 believers rely on on a deity and economists 
put their faith in rationality.9 Blackburn considers it to be impossible to find a 
biological source of ethics,10 but what if he is wrong and we actually could replace 
these constructs or black boxes with a simple, ultimate driver that can explain and 
justify as much and has the potential to unify contemporary theories of ethics? What 
if a universal driver can be found in nature itself? In this article I will argue that our 
norms can be derived from biological facts. I will not do that by stating that biological 
facts can become equal to norms; they cannot. I however will use evolutionary 
psychological theories and facts of cooperation to transform biological mechanisms 
into normative thinking. For people will value an act as good when it makes them feel 
happy, which is an effect of the improvement of the chances of reproduction. It is my 
goal to draw the outlines of an ultimate evolutionary psychological justification of 
proximate ethical reasoning, so that philosophers and scientists in future can build on 
the ethics project using similar presuppositions. However, from genes to ethics is a 
long walk. I cannot possibly fill in all the details within one article. Nonetheless, not 
starting this enterprise, believing it is impossible, will not help us either. As Blackburn 
acknowledges the biological fact that we are social animals and that we need to 
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coordinate our efforts,11 but fails to fest ethics in physical processes I will engage in a 
discussion with him because I think our disagreement can be helpful. 
I will start by discussing some dichotomies in contemporary ethics. Then I will 
encounter some frequently raised objections against inferring the ultimate drives of 
people from the fact that only genes that spread successfully will not vanish. And I 
will conclude with the consequence this theory has for ethics in a global society.  
 
Abandoning dualistic visions and black boxes 
 
The dualistic vision always has need for some kind of black box out there, and such a 
construct is for that very reason outside the scope of science, which tries to 
comprehend our world without metaphysical explanations. If we accept that we can 
have no knowledge of values that exist in a metaphysical world, because all 
knowledge comes to us through our brain, which is the biological point of view, the 
most logical conclusion is that values as we know them find their cause in nature.12 
Blackburn states that ‘we do not expect laws of ethics to play a role in treatises of 
physics’,13 but what if ethics – what we think we ought to do – finds its cause and 
justification in physical, molecular processes and also has enormous consequences 
for how these processes evolve? Is then ethics not also to be studied by physical 
methods? 
Abandoning the dualistic vision and embracing the monistic vision unfolds new 
insights. The present-day study of ethics then seems to abound with false 
dichotomies. As I argued earlier, acknowledging that ethics is founded in physical 
properties of genes that generate humans within a varying environment probably will 
help to overcome such dichotomies as is-ought, explanation-justification, deontology-
consequentialism, altruism-egoism, in-group-out-group, reductionism-holism, and so 
on.14  
In this article I will attempt to translate philosophical notions into biological terms in 
order to transform the habitual dualistic thought processes of normative scholars into 
the monistic mental approach customary amongst scientists. Nowadays, there is 
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enough empirical material to construct a biological foundation for ethics, so that we 
no longer need black boxes to fill an unexplainable gap. If, as I will argue, this 
biological foundation is universal amongst humans, it can function as the foundation 
of global ethics as well. I agree with Blackburn that we can find the foundations of 
ethics in ourselves and have no need of an external force. This makes a discussion 
of Blackburn’s reasoning from a biological perspective fruitful. Blackburn 
acknowledges the biological fact that we are social animals and that we need to 
coordinate our efforts, but he fails to fest ethics in physical processes.15 Inevitably, 
Blackburn concludes that people can know what is right and what is bad simply 
because that is the commitment they received from the past. ‘Across large tracts of 
human affairs, we know what to think. We can be fairly confident about the standards 
we use’.16 I find this conclusion dissatisfying. This reasoning reminds me of Baron 
Münchhausen, who allegedly managed to pull himself (and his horse) out of 
a swamp by his own hair. The ultimate foundation of ethics remains in the dark. In 
this article I will search for ultimate justifications. The proximate justification for not 
stealing may be that such behavior destabilizes society, but why is destabilizing 
society bad? Why have many people through the ages and in all parts of the world 
felt so strongly that stealing is not good? Stripped to its essence, their belief rests on 
the fact that destabilization threatens not only the group members but the underlying 
genes as well. Somehow this knowledge permeates our commitments.  
At this point some clarification is needed on the role of genes in the 
evolutionary process. The idea of the gene as a blueprint has been abandoned in 
biology for some time now. Merely, the gene contains a code that drives a process 
that takes place within an influencing environment. Although oaks, for example, have 
the same genes that subscribe the process of growth, the actual shape of each oak 
differs because of the influence of (micro or macro) environmental influences. The 
oaks, as well as human beings, can be considered processes of life in stead of 
things.17 Information in and properties of genes steer the process, but do not 
determine it. Having said this, oaks can be recognized as oaks because they have 
similar drives. Because oaks, as well as humans, have genes that steer them, they 
will – like all life forms – be stable, replicate, need nutrients, reciprocate and spread 
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their genes. Their ultimate drive is to spread their genes for those life forms or 
processes that did not, vanished. Every living creature will find its own way to spread 
its genes, very much influenced by its environment, but our genes have been 
selected by evolution to cause traits that make us successful in doing that. Whereas 
oaks are successful by being strong, stable and by producing lots of acorns, humans 
are especially evolutionary successful by being social and cooperative and by caring 
for their few children. 
 
Explanation and justification 
 
Many philosophers and biologists, as Blackburn does too, acknowledge biology can 
explain our need for cooperation. Biology does not make the claim that we ought to 
spread our genes, we simply do. However, can the biological urge to spread genes 
also be used to justify our deeds? How could we translate the physical properties of 
genes (e.g. stability, replication, need for food) into normative expressions? In effect, 
this translation takes place when we feel good if the circumstances to spread our 
genes are optimal. Accordingly, we try to extort such circumstances by acting in a 
certain way or by prescribing others how to behave. For example, it feels good to 
cooperate because cooperation will enhance the spreading of the genes of the group 
members, therefore people will reason that cooperation is good, that we ought to 
cooperate.  When we value events and situations, we express ourselves in terms of 
what is ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘obligatory’, ‘right’ or ‘justifiable’.18 These words are the 
language we use to tell others why they must behave in a certain way. According to 
expressivism, we use values to express our states of mind; we do not merely 
describe our mindset. However, normative expressions can be translated in biological 
terms.  When I say drinking water is good, from a biological point of view I am 
actually saying that I feel drinking water is good because my body needs it. Evolution 
selected people that feel bad when they are thirsty for to long. People will feel a very 
strong urge to find water and will feel happy when they can drink it eventually. Then 
people will exclaim: ‘This is good! Drinking water is good because it helps me to 
survive (and procreate).’  We value things by and for their effect on our well-being, 
that is our survival, our health, our resources and our possibilities to spread our 
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genes. In other words, our valuations have a biological purpose: they facilitate the 
spreading of our genes, and only valuations that do so successfully will endure. 
More, valuations are, like feelings, a biopsychological phenomenon. Biology makes 
us feel we ought to act in a way that facilitates the spreading of our genes. As an 
effect we, as biological beings, reason with help of our brain we ought to act in that 
way. As Trivers states, many people and philosophers deny this truth to themselves, 
exactly because self-deception is an evolutionary successful trait.19 By convincing 
ourselves spreading our genes is not our ultimate biological goal, we will appear 
more civilized than others and will get a good reputation. Still, our actions, thoughts 
and values are shot through with those biological drives. 
As Damasio shows, our mind is part of our body and cannot be separated 
from it.20 We always have background feelings by which we are aware of the state 
our body is in. The state of our body affects our brain, and therefore our thoughts, 
through the brainstem and hormones. In addition, the lymbic system has a much 
stronger influence on the cortex than vice versa.21 Our cognitive skills have evolved 
around older evolutionary parts of the brain and seem to be better versions of the 
same general capacities.22 They are ‘just’ highly sophisticated feed back systems 
that improve our reactions and behavior. Whereas a chimpanzee will get bezirk when 
another takes its food,23 thanks to our neocortex we can make clear beforehand to 
other people that we do not like our food to be ‘stolen’ and that we will punish them if 
they do. We thus prevent our food being taken.  
What we experience as the ‘self’ is actually a product of biological information 
that emanates from our entire body.24 Our ‘thinking’ is the effect of biological 
processes that are all directed towards survival and reproduction. It can activate the 
production of chemicals that in turn activate, for instance, our immune system.25 In 
addition, sex hormones that are produced in our body have a powerful impact on our 
brain and thus our mind. Emotions that are triggered by a physical event give us 
                                                 
19
 Robert Trivers, The Folly of Fools, New York: Basic Books 2011, 3 
20
 Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, New York: Putnam 
1994 
21
 Katarina Gospic et al., Limbic Justice, PLOS Biology 2011; Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 
New York: Simon and Schuster 1998 
22
 Barrett, Dunbar and Lycett (note 5), 320 
23
 Keith Jensen, Josep Call and Michael Tomasello, Chimpanzees Are Vengeful but Not Spiteful, 2007 
PNAS, 13046-13050 
24
 Damasio (note 20); Barrett, Dunbar and Lycett (note 5), 289 
25
 Candace B. Pert, Molecules of Emotion, New York: Scribner 1997 
 7 
feelings that can lead to mental images. Thoughts can go in all directions and can be 
anywhere. They seem to be of a totally different order than our brain cells, but is this 
really true? Do not our thoughts follow patterns that are very similar to the patterns in 
our brain? As I speculated earlier, they would seem to do so. The fractal structure of 
multi-branched pyramidical neurons permeates our associative unconscious 
thoughts.26 Our physical brain structure seems to be mirrored in our thoughts, which 
then are probably physical as well. The separation of body and mind must be 
considered a false dualism. As a consequence, the mind is nothing more and nothing 
less than the effect of biological processes and structures within our mind, brought 
into existence by evolution that favours systems that make underlying genes to 
spread. 
 
Cause-centered or norm-centered? 
 
This seems to be a cause-centered approach. We consider drinking water good 
because water helps us to spread our genes. If we did not value drinking water 
evolution would simply ‘sweep us away’.27 However, the peculiar thing is that this 
approach is also norm-centered. All of us must drink water in order to be able to 
spread our genes. As all of our ancestors must have learned (they would not be our 
ancestors if they had not), water is indispensable to survival. In this way, evolution 
determines our mindset, our values. We have learnt how to think in accordance with 
the principles of evolution. To hold a value is ‘to have a relatively fixed attitude to 
some aspect of things’ set to feel pain when concerns are not met.28 In biological 
terms, values are principles that have evolved during evolution and that function as 
stable guides that help us to make choices in new, unknown situations. Drinking 
water is good, so if we encounter an unknown pool of water and we are thirsty, we 
must drink from it for if we do not we will feel pain physically and mentally. The 
explanation becomes the justification. If we do not drink water, we should have little 
hope of spreading our genes. Ergo, ‘thou shalt drink water’. Or as Deuteronomy 8:1 
instructs us: ‘You must carefully observe everything that I command you this day so 
that you may live and increase and may enter and occupy the land.’ Even religion 
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acknowledges that our norms are justified by our ultimate drive to fill the earth. The 
essential thing for humans is to ‘be fruitful and increase, fill the earth and subdue it’.29 
Culture, religion, law and ethics thus can be considered the products of our minds 
that try to create the right circumstances for procreation in an ever changing 
environment. Thus, also religious norms will essentially be directed in line with the 
quintessential drive of any living organism to reproduce, increase and fill the earth 
with its genes. 
From this perspective, values are (just) another way to communicate about our 
environment. Values help us telling others and ourselves what is a good way to life, 
in order to be evolutionary successful. If we would only observe facts as they are we 
would not know how to act in order to spread our genes successfully. Evolution thus 
selected those creatures that knew how to act. In a way, evolution uses hormones, 
emotions, feelings, thoughts and values to show us the ‘right’ direction.  An infant will 
project desires on almost anything that moves.30 Even adults interpret moving 
triangles and a circle as the circle that was bullying the small triangle, which was 
saved by the large triangle.31 However chilling the effect of this observation may be, 
the very sensations of disenchantment and fear are also given to us by nature itself. 
We are afraid to be left alone in the dark, not knowing what to do or to hold on to. In 
times of crisis we need a shoulder to lean on. We depend on the help of others and 
find comfort in enchantments. Still, there is nothing to be afraid of. The secret that lies 
within us will not take away our love, our empathy, our altruism, our need for world 
peace, or our awe of the amazing universe, nor will it reduce the richness of 
experience, knowledge, fantasy or science, as Rose, Kamin and Lewontin suppose.32 
They fear the idea that brains ‘are determinate biological objects whose properties 
produce the behaviors we observe and the states of thought or intention we infer 
from that behavior’. However, the genes that contain the necessary codes to create a 
brain cannot develop into an ethical being without resources from its environment. 
They arte not blueprints, but merely codes that steer processes. They cannot even 
produce a brain without interacting with other genes. Genes therefore cannot 
determine our future; they will merely drive us in certain directions. The genes of an 
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oak make it form branches, whereas the environment will influence the moment and 
place of formation. 
 
Deontology and consequentialism 
 
There seems to be another paradox here. Genes drive our action into the direction of 
their replication and spreading, whereas only genes that replicate and spread are 
evolutionary successful. Are we considering our actions ‘good’ because our drives tell 
us so, or are they ‘good’ because this will cause genes to spread. This paradox can 
be translated as the ethical discord between deontology and consequentialism. 
Although it may seem that a choice between these two lines of thought is imperative 
or indeed inevitable, they are in fact two sides of a coin. We can state that there are 
principles that can be considered so essential as to be beyond debate and we must 
therefore act in accordance with them.33 This is the deontological way of thinking. 
‘Boundaries to our actions are justified because they enable us to get along, or avoid 
conflict, or in other words promote the social good or help avoid social distress’.34 
Deontologists will refuse to do things that contravene their principles. There are 
‘private “no-go areas” that are borrowed from the public function of ethics’.35 That is, 
deontologists’ emotions, their intuition, will tell them to act otherwise. To put it 
differently, the deontological point of view will emphasize the driving force of our 
genes in our actions. Consequentialists, on the other hand, evaluate what is good by 
estimating the consequences of their actions. They appreciate the social function of 
ethics; moral attitudes must have some kind of function and without values human life 
will go badly.36 In other words, the consequentialistic point of view will underline that 
we must act in a certain way to prevent our genes to become extinct. However, in 
fact our genes drive us and thus we feel we must act in a way to prevent extinction. I 
will illustrate this by applying this idea on the issue of cooperation. 
From a biological point of view, values have evolved in the evolutionary 
(genetic and cultural) past and have been internalized. Game theory shows that a tit-
for-tat strategy is an evolutionary stable strategy.37 People who cooperate, and only 
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desist from doing so if others do too, will gain most. In evolution gaining more means 
spreading your genes faster. Thus evolution will select on this strategy in groups. 
Group members that help each other harvesting will have more food. People that 
expect others to cooperate will have more offspring and will eventually supersede 
non-cooperators. In fact, the development of our enormous brain probably made us 
champions of indirect reciprocity and long-term cooperation. Brains are extremely 
expensive to grow and maintain.38 They are heavy, make us vulnerable, use lots of 
energy, make birth painful and infants helpless, so that a high level of parental 
investment (which also requires males to invest) in their offspring is needed.39 
However, the benefit of having an enormous neocortex is that humans have the 
ability to solve complex social problems.40 Humans have become masters of social 
interaction. Humans as social animals are predisposed to trusting each other and to 
only retaliate if others take a free ride. In this way, organisms using a tit-for-tat 
strategy can sustain cooperative interactions for a long time. As Hume said, ‘It will be 
for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in 
the same manner with regard to me’.41 Blackburn acknowledges that natural growth 
was founded on the expectation of benefit in return.42 Alexander speaks of indirect 
reciprocity: a group can only function as a group if people gain by investing in it.43 
Morals, values, duties and laws will help promote this attitude among group 
members. This implies that deontology and consequentialism are not essentially 
dissimilar; rather, they complement each other. Where deontology emphasizes 
biological predispositions that drive behavior, consequentialism anticipates the effect 
on the group. For either deliberation to be labeled ‘right’ or ‘good’, the outcome 
should be that our genes spread successfully. Both ways of thinking justify our 
actions in the light of our genes prospering. A person, let us call him Johnny – like 
Blackburn does -, is altruistic when he brings his thirsty comrade water.44 The result 
is that Johnny will feel ‘good’ (deontological) and an important group member will 
survive (consequentialistic). 
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The power of reputation 
 
The person that saves his comrade seems to act altruisticly, whereas he is actually 
acting according his internal drives. Belonging to a group will enhance his 
evolutionary success and thus he will feel happy if he can help his fellows. Although it 
seems as if groupnorms are of a higher source, we are simple fooling ourselves to 
enchance cooperation (Trivers 2011, 280).45 People are driven by their feelings to do 
things that have good consequences. When Johnny is reported to have done 
something good, the informant shows his admiration.46 Johnny acted to the benefit of 
the admirer (brought him water). The admirer not only expresses his state of mind 
(espressivism), he also relates implicitely what it is Johnny should do (bring water). If 
Johnny brings water to the admirer, this ultimately will improve the admirer’s chances 
of spreading his genes, and probably also Johnny’s genes because of his admired 
state within the group. In fact, when the informant is female, a mating opportunity 
may well present itself. Men with a high social status have more mating 
opportunities.47 By acknowledging that ‘It is good to bring my admirer water!’, Johnny 
becomes a ‘believer’. Adopting a religious belief amounts to much the same thing. If 
we acknowledge that ‘Jesus is the way!’, we will earn the respect of our fellow 
Christian group members and we will have all the benefits of belonging to that strong 
and successful group. Moreover, if what they say is true, we will have a chance to 
reach heaven where we will live forever, and to live forever is exactly what genes are 
programmed to do. 
Like Johnny, we ‘wonder whether our actions are really justifiable, as it were in 
the eyes of God’: what actions are obligatory?48 In essence, we ask ourselves how to 
behave in the eyes of our fellow group members that tell us what God asks of us. 
Trying to fulfill group demands we do our utmost to believe in God, a transcendental 
entity that holds all ethical propositions. The propositions of the group seem to 
become non-natural, distinct from psychology and nature. According to Kant, virtue is 
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visible in ‘the will’s firm resolution to conform with every duty’,49 where duty is the 
fundamental concept.50 Thus, people live up to the expectations of the group and the 
group will flourish. According to G.E. Moore, we can know the non-natural good 
through our intuition,51 and in this way the circle is closed. Our intuition tells us to 
endorse the beliefs of the group, and the group believes God tells them how to 
behave. Thus, we believe in God and subsequently we can know how to behave 
through our intuition. In fact, God turns out to be a means to empower the demands 
of the group to which we want to belong, because belonging has so many benefits. 
The group gives us shelter, protection and resources. Our intuitions, that is our 
unconscious drives, tell us that joining a group is the best we, as social animals, can 
do. As individuals rely on cooperation and prefer cooperation that is permanent, they 
are likely to invest readily in the group.52 A group member is more likely to tell others 
where the best fishing grounds are in small villages than in large villages.53 Such a 
group member will boost his reputation as an altruist and will in the long run benefit 
from it. 
Johnny grows up – he is now John – and discovers that drinking water is good 
but that drinking orange juice is better. Being a ‘good’ citizen, John shares his 
discovery with his admirer, yet this time the admirer is shocked. The group has 
always thought water is best and it has projected this value on God: God says 
drinking water is best. The ancient scriptures confirm it. A dissenting opinion can 
breach group coherence. Not only does John pose a threat to group coherence, he 
also (and at the same time) implicitly disputes the authority of God. To maintain 
group coherence, John has to renounce his discovery or suffer the consequences 
(expulsion).54 People will no longer admire him and he will feel bad. Being cast out 
into the dark and unknown implies certain death. This most certainly does not favor 
his genes. As John has internalized the voices of others and he cannot defend his 
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destabilizing actions, he probably will feel guilt.55 In other words, his feelings – that is 
ultimately his genes - tell him he has to live by the norms of his group. 
Nevertheless, ‘we recognize the possibility of correctly dissenting from the 
herd’.56 However, this is not because the dissenting individual knows the absolute 
truth, but because sometimes an individual knows what is best for himself and the 
group. In John’s case a religious scholar may interpret the holy text in such a way 
that orange juice is in fact water with some food (nutrients) added. From that point 
on, the group can safely regard orange juice as best, without renouncing Gods 
values, without endangering group coherence. At the same time, dissenting from the 
herd is tricky. While dissension may pay off handsomely (eternal fame and lots of 
reproductive chances), death is a very real risk (and with it genetic extinction). 
Conformity will be the rule, dissension the exception. 
 
Altruism and egoism 
 
The group gives humans, as social animals, vital benefits. It will provide protection, 
shelter, resources, special products, help in times of need, and so on. Belonging to a 
group is for human individuals an excellent strategy to spread their genes. But group 
membership does not come free. By the law of reciprocation all participants have to 
end with a net benefit.57 We have to invest in the group, just like other members do, 
and thus invest indirectly in ourselves. However, if people want to belong to a group 
because their main drive is to spread their genes, does this not mean that 
‘underneath the surface lies the ruthless pursuit of self-interest’, as Blackburn 
suggests?58 Need we not try to teach generosity and altruism to keep our self-
centered nature under control? 
However, this line of thought implies that our genes make us self-centered, 
which is not actually true. We are born ultra-social animals that like to cooperate and 
love the company of other people.59 This makes us feel to love helping other people. 
Labeling human action in an ethical debate as ‘egoistic’ or ‘altruistic’ is unfortunate, 
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because these are not objective terms. They merely value our behavior in relation to 
the group. When are we being altruistic or egoistic? If we are pure altruists we are 
anybody’s fool, yet if we act as pure egoists we are no less foolish. The underlying 
conflict is the problem of reciprocity. In order to spread our genes, we have to invest 
in a group, but at the same time we have to get something back. As Richard 
Alexander puts it, social investment may yield a long-term benefit. ‘Moral systems are 
the means to make sure that these investments are not in vain’.60 To keep this 
equilibrium in balance people use terms like altruism and egoism. In the context of 
valuing groupmembers these terms will do. However, in the debate of ultimate 
foundations of ethics these labels are highly confusing. Am I really being altruistic 
when the prospect of the survival of whales gives me pleasure, although I might 
expect to be dead before the survival of whales has been secured, as Blackburn 
suggests?61 Probably not, for it is not me as an individual that is the center of my 
world, but it is my genes. Survival of whales is good for my genes, because my 
grandchildren (in whom my genes live on) will (in some way) benefit from that 
survival. Pleasure is a feeling that is the result of eons of evolution. It tells me when 
my behavior favors the spreading my genes. The survival of whales reminds me of 
preserved nature, of a healthy climate and of a bright future. The feeling of pleasure 
that is caused by observing a group of whales swimming about freely with their young 
is related to the pleasure of finding a mate and have sex in fortunate circumstances. 
Under such conditions my genes will spread best. At least that is what evolution tells 
me after a million years of experience. This evolutionary experience tells me to 
campaign for the survival of whales. Campaigning makes me feel good, because 
ultimately it will enhance the spreading of my genes. On top of that, the campaigning 
team will undoubtedly be very coherent; its membership will value cooperation and is 
likely to include potential mates. Thus my altruistic behavior will give me a good 
reputation and will favour the genes that make this kind of behavior possible. 
Essentially, it is all about investments that will be paid back some time. 
For the same reasons it gives me pleasure to work for my neighbor,62 or to 
share goods within my group (Gommer 2011c).63 I feel compassion with my fellow 
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group members, because this will boost concern and cooperation. Sharing and 
showing compassion are labeled as virtues. You shall share and you shall show 
compassion (prescription), in order to spread your genes (justification) because 
sharing and showing compassion will enhance cooperation (explanation). We pity our 
friends, not only because we are more fearful for ourselves when we see friends in 
distress,64 but also because we will feel compassion with useful companions.  
As every biologist knows, genes are neither egoistic nor altruistic. They just 
react to their environment. If the environment is beneficial, they will find enough 
nutrients to multiply. If the environment is detrimental, they will vanish. Genes 
generate (i.e. have the codes for) organisms. Only genes that are part of an organism 
that finds enough nutrients will spread. For that reason, each organism will have the 
urge to search for food. Organisms that need groups to find food, as humans do, 
have the urge to cooperate. They have the urge to invest in the group, but at the 
same time they expect their investment to yield food. Cooperation has become a part 
of their existence, a second nature. Group members appreciate it when others invest 
in the group and will admire them as altruists and altruistically share their food with 
them. Those who do not invest are considered selfish and will be excluded from 
sharing food. We do not join groups because of a conscious cost-benefit analysis; 
evolution has made that analysis for us. In the past, say, one million years, our 
ancestors were better off by cooperating within groups. This cooperation protected 
them effectively against other humanoids that did not or not sufficiently cooperate. 
Cooperation has made our race successful in spreading over the world. Evolution 
has favored cooperators and a cooperative attitude has become a human 
predisposition. Humans have become social animals or even ultra-social animals, as 
Richerson and Boyd suggest.65 Cooperation gives humans so many benefits that the 
‘altruistic’ capability, that is the capability to help others and feel their pain, 
sometimes demonstrated by individuals cannot be distinguished from ‘true’ altruism. 
 
A biological fallacy? 
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Blackburn perceives a fallacy here.66 He accepts that genes that cause people to act 
in a way that is good for replication in a certain environment, plausibly explains the 
evolution of that characteristic. However, if one states that ‘human beings are to be 
interpreted as consciously of unconsciously pursuing their genetic succes’ one is 
committing the biological fallacy. ‘Nobody would be stupid enough to commit this 
fallacy outright’, inferring the ultimate drives of people ‘from the fact that his or her 
genes have proved good at replicating over time’, he says. Genes maybe relevant to 
a skill, but they do not determine, independently of the environment what we do. The 
latter is true, of course. However, Blackburn seems to be too quickly in dismissing the 
idea that our actions can very often be explained by evolutionary processes. Let 
alone the idea that we justify our deeds in the light of the driving force of evolution 
which is the spreading of genes. 
Blackburn gives three examples in an attempt to refute this inferring of our 
behavior from the characteristics of genes. First, he mentions the bystander effect, 
second he refers to homosexuality and third he states that many people choose not 
to reproduce. As I see it, Blackburn labels specific behavior non-adaptive on the 
basis of a simplistic analysis.67 I will discuss these three examples because they are 
used more often in attempts to refute evolutionary explanations of human motives. 
And I will add another puzzling behavior: infanticide. The derivation of behavior and 
norms is not as simple as it seems. Some norms seem to be counterproductive, 
whereas they prove to be very productive on second sight. 
 
The bystander effect 
 
The paradox of the bystander effect is related to the fact that one must infer from the 
drive to spread our genes that we will feel that it is good to help our friends. For 
helping friends has proved a successful strategy for our genes to spread.68 However, 
if it were good for our reputation and therefore for our own good to help friends, why 
then do people often not go to the aid of others when there are other people about to 
be impressed?69 This effect can easily be explained. Firstly, people unconsciously 
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will try to avoid a risk by hoping that someone else will take it. Secondly, people may 
feel unsure if the situation is really serious as so many do not do anything. Thirdly, if 
we are the only ones there, we will help, because failure will go unnoticed and 
success can be advertized. Watched by others bystanders, we might make a fool of 
ourselves if we were to fail or if the emergency proved false.70 Conforming to the 
group that will survive by doing nothing feels as important as saving a group member. 
The norm is not only to help a groupmember in need, but also to conform to the 




The second ‘more obvious’ example Blackburn gives is the evolutionary 
psychological idea that homosexuality is a way of helping your brothers and sisters to 
raise more children.71 Homosexuality may be a potentially useful trait when it comes 
to assisting genetic relatives, but it is – according to Blackburn - ‘of course crazy’ to 
take this as a remark about human psychology. However, Blackburn fails to show 
why an evolutionary mechanism cannot have psychological consequences. The idea 
maybe not as crazy as Blackburn suggests. As it turns out, many homosexual men 
have older brothers.72 Two or more boys in one family will compete and might even 
kill each other. The strongest will survive and will spread its genes. But if the second 
and the third brothers are homosexual they do not need to compete. This could be a 
successful strategy for all concerned if the heterosexual brother can produce more 
offspring because of the aid given him by his gay brothers. The homosexual brothers 
are likely to experience a sense of gratification; they can fulfill their need to nurture (a 
femine trait) while still being able to have meaningful relationships without having to 
compete with heterosexual group members for mating partners. Psychology follows 
the underlying evolutionary strategy. Interestingly, most people do not dislike 
homosexuals as long as they do not ‘practice’ their preference. This practice may fill 
heterosexuals with disgust when they imagining what it would be like. In fact, 
homophoby seems to be a psychological response of males that have a sexual 
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arousal when seeing homosexuals having sex. Homosexuality may well be a direct 
threat to their hidden identity.73 Accordingly, it can feel threatening when a 
homosexual would like to have sex with you. Thus, most anti-homosexual laws are 
against practicing and showing it. Moreover, the principle of second-born boys that 
help their families reproduce is institutionalized in the Tibetan monastery tradition.74 
In American Catholic families with five or more children a son is more likely to 
become a priest than in other families.75 Indeed, becoming a nun, a monk or a priest 
is more than compensated for by the effect of their help on the fertility of group 
members.76 No research results are available concerning homosexuals, but a similar 
effect, strong enough to make homosexuality evolutionary highly adaptive, does not 
seem unlikely. If so, then homosexuals would almost be the natural candidates for 
becoming nuns or monks because their psychology fits the job. In fact, in Japanese 
Buddhist monasteries homosexuality was not considered wrong, far from it: it was 




The ‘clearest instance of the fallacy’, according to Blackburn, is the belief that we 
have a ‘ruthless, burning desire to perpetuate our genes’ where so many people 
‘obviously’ do not.78 ‘In fact, concern about our genes is incredibly faint: few of us in 
the First World can be persuaded to give up exuding even a little of our five tons of 
hydrocarbons per annum by the thought that our grandchildren’s grandchildren will 
have a harder time if we don’t.’ This is a gross oversimplification of sociobiological 
principles. Blackburn is intermingling ultimate and proximate explanations. It is a 
biological fact that genes only spread if their carrier (the organism) manages to do so. 
All of our ancestors must have had an urge to spread their genes at the right 
moment. A ruthless, burning desire would be counterproductive. Women only need to 
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mate once every two years and still be extremely successful at reproducing. If men 
were to attempt to have intercourse with every woman they laid eyes on, they would 
soon be killed by these women’s male partners. Thus, the genes of men driven by an 
uninhibited ‘ruthless, burning desire’ would not be successful. Probably, it is men that 
invest in their partner who will have more offspring and who will be much more 
successful in spreading their genes.79 On a proximate psychological level this will be 
expressed in a desire for men to care for their baby.80 And this may very well lead to 
the value that males have to take part in raising their children, which in turn could 
underlie laws that prohibit polygamy. Although on a proximate level monogamy will 
be justified by God’s will or the stability of society, ultimately its justification lies in the 
biological fact that children with less parental care are less likely to survive. At least in 
a large society, monogamy benefits the spreading of the genes of males and 
females. People probably justify their choices more comfortably on proximate 
grounds, because justification on an ultimate level requires much more abstract 
reasoning. Most people being unable to cope with more than four levels of mental 
state reflexivity,81 they probably find it equally strenuous to think on more ultimate 
levels of justification. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that men more than women think a lot about sex.82 
They have a desire for sex (and yes, quite possibly a burning one) at the right 
moment. The sex drive is one of the strongest biological drives people experience. 
There are precious few right moments. If a beautiful (that is healthy) woman invites a 
single man to have sex with her, no strings attached, such a man must ‘of course be 
crazy’ to reject the offer. In fact many fantasies, works of literature and lyrics take 
their cue from this assumption. Consider, for example, ‘Bad Touch’ by The 
Bloodhound Gang: ‘You and me baby ain’t nothing but mammal, so let’s do it like 
they do it on Discovery Channel’. Yet, our culture seems to favor a controlled urge: 
procreate at the right moment with the right partner under the right circumstances. 
Until recently, in some parts the United States adultery was sufficient justification for 
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murder.83 Sexual contact with a healthy woman that is married may not be such a 
good idea if one wants so spread genes. 
Probably the easiest way by far to rebel against our urges is to mislead them: 
have sex but use contraception and do not procreate. Our genes will not spread and 
no new organisms will evolve. No more happiness (offspring), but no more suffering 
either. However, quite a few other people are likely to rebel against their drives: they 
want to have babies. When they do, their genes will prosper and that is why humanity 
as a whole will always strive for new offspring. So, it makes sense to continue to 
procreate. That at least will ensure that in future there will be people that are as 




There are many examples of a seeming contradiction between the psychology of 
humans and evolutionary drives. Infanticide of newborns, for instance, is a 
widespread and near-universal phenomenon,84 but it seems to contradict the 
psychological urge to ensure the survival of our offspring. Parents cherish children 
out of love.85 Love here means that parents feel their children are everything they live 
for, and from an evolutionary viewpoint that is exactly true. Mostly they do not say 
they ought to love their children, that is, they do not think of this as ‘ethical’,86 
because their emotion tells them what is the right thing to do. Nevertheless, this 
loving emotion is reflected in Article 18 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
which stipulates that ‘the best interests of the child will be [the parents] basic 
concern’. 
Nonetheless, in many societies babies are not considered human before some 
key event or ritual.87 Overcrowding, lack of resources, no male support, and 
disabilities can be factors that could drive the mother to kill her baby.88 On a 
proximate level a mother will probably panic when she gives birth to a child in a 
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hostile environment. On an ultimate level her state of mind anticipates inadequate 
conditions for spreading her genes. Under extreme conditions, or conditions that she 
experiences as extreme, a mother’s unconscious state of mind can drive her to 
infanticide.89 Of course, infanticide is no longer an option if a newborn child can be 
left in the care of relatives and in many African societies this is precisely what 
happens.90 By contrast, in Amazonian tribal societies and Eskimo societies where 
fostering is not feasible because of the harsh environmental conditions infanticide 
rates are very high.91 Such a difference could very well lead to diverging ethical 
standards. In the African societies referred to infanticide will probably be considered 
wrong, whereas in Amazonian and Eskimo societies no such stigma is likely attach to 
infanticide. In fact, some Amazonian tribes are known to bury disabled children 
alive.92 In the Western world, where there are plenty of possibilities for children to be 
given up for adoption or into care, such behavior cannot be justified in any way, but 
for the Amazonian Indians it is (or was) a matter of life and death to adhere to other 
values regarding infanticide. 
 
Nature and culture 
 
Far from being consciously aware of it, organisms are ultimately driven by the fact 
that their genes must spread, or vanish. This principle permeates all actions of all 
organisms and the outcome depends on the circumstances. For ultra-social animals 
that humans are, it is favorable to cooperate. Thus laws are justified because they 
enhance cooperation within the group, so that we will feel happy. According to Hume, 
virtues cause pleasure because they are ‘useful or agreeable to ourselves or 
others’.93 We will feel happy if we behave well.94 Utilitarianism uses happiness as an 
evaluation criterion. Laws are justified ‘in so far they contribute to the public good’, 
that is public happiness.95 Authorities must therefore free us from obstacles to 
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happiness, such as ‘want, ignorance, pain, disease, fear’.96 Utilitarism thus can be 
considered a proximate translation of the ultimate drive to spread our genes. 
Ultimately, it is not about maximizing happiness or maximizing profit, but from a 
proximate perspective it makes some sense. As Hardin demonstrated in his 
influential article The Tragedy of the Commons, it would never pay for an individual to 
reduce the grazing of his herd in order to save the public land from overgrazing.97 He 
would feel very unhappy if the herds of his fellow villagers would go on grazing. Not 
because the individual is concerned about the beautiful land, but because he is 
concerned about his future perspectives. So arrangements are called for to overcome 
the problem, because only if the villagers cooperate they can survive. 
Blackburn’s conclusion that predicting that human traits, let alone human 
values and norms, are an expression of the drive to reproduce our genetic material is 
‘deeply unpromising’ is too easy.98 Culture matters, of course, it is part of the 
conditions we live in, but to acknowledge the basic biological drives in humans is 
necessary to understand what they want and what they think they are obliged to do. 
If the man that meets the beautiful woman, is not single but married, he may still ‘be 
crazy’ to reject the offer if no one will know. However, if there is a slight chance that 
his adultery will be detected, and if the group believes adultery is not a good strategy, 
the man may reconsider. He is likely to be condemned for not rejecting the beautiful 
woman’s offer. He will lose the admiration of his fellow group members, of his wife, of 
his children. He may even be murdered. As a result his chances of a larger offspring 
will diminish considerably. If the beliefs, the culture, the religion of the group have 
evolved in such a way that it is forbidden to commit adultery, it would be better to 
respect that prohibition. This is probably why there is no correlation between high 
social status and mating opportunities for men aged 40 years or older.99 Although 
they might be appealing mates, the consequences of adultery for them and their 
offspring may be severe. 
Does this contradict biological foundations of ethics? I think not. Culture is the 
result of what group members learn from each other in order to deal with changing 
conditions. It is the product of biological drives and the circumstances where people 
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live in and consequently becomes part of the new created environment. Like the 
physical organism it is generated by genes to protect and nourish themselves. 
Imitation and other learning processes are features that evolved because they will 
enhance the spreading of genes that are linked to the genes that make learning 
possible. Researchers have observed how chimpanzees used the technique that was 
shown to them. Although there were two techniques, poking and lifting, to retrieve 
fruit from a box the chimpanzees stuck to the method they had copied. This resulted 
in two linear transmission chains, two simple cultures. A comparative study with 
children generated the same result.100 Frans de Waal stresses the importance of 
imitation by stating that without demonstrations neither chimpanzees nor young 
children were able to retrieve any food from the box.101 Without imitation, no food. 
Without culture, no prosperity. 
The system of values, of rules, is part of a culture. Both are the result of 
biological mechanisms that interact with the environment. As Malik puts it: ‘Culture is 
not a mere encrustation upon human nature, like dirt on a soiled shirt. It is an integral 
part of it because human nature can only be expressed through human culture.’102 
That is why so many characteristics are common to all cultures.103 Burial rituals, sex 
role differentiation, incest taboos and food rituals are found everywhere because they 
reflect biological urges. In fact, as Lance Workman and Will Reader (2008, p. 403) 
observe, human cultures are strikingly similar ‘when viewed from a suitably abstract 
level’.104 Natural selection is a statistical process. The physical bodies of humans 
practically have not changed for over hundreds of thousands of years,105 whereas the 
environment wherein they lived varied enormously. By evolving an ability to generate 
culture and sustain it, humans could rapidly adapt to new circumstances.106 Although 
one could emphazise the biologicial basis of specific cultural practices  or focus on 
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imitation of elements of culture, this is merely a matter of emphasis.107 The fact 
remains that certain drives and principles benefit evolutionary fitness and therefore 
they (and their underlying genes) spread over the population.108 As a result they have 
become the driving forces of culture. Consequently, culture is shaped in accordance 
with the biological and psychological image of man. Although Blackburn will agree 
that, for example, pottery and incest taboos have positive effects on fitness, he fails 
to see that cultural practices like infanticide or founding monasteries may enhance 
fitness as well, be it in a more complicated way.  Because of this Blackburn (1998, 
150) is still stuck in the conventional nature-nurture dichotomy.109 But there is no 
such dichotomy: it is false.110 Without nurture a gene will never have the opportunity 
to grow. In other words, the outcome of the growth process will always be the result 
of the interaction of nature and nurture. I agree with Blackburn that there will be 
endless new cases, because of changing circumstances, but from this it does not 
follow that there is not a single driving force behind every pattern.111 The biological 
process of fractal growth in biological structures like oaks, generated by genetic 
codes, is one of phenotypic plasticity, the ability to vary according to 
circumstances.112 In a way culture, the result of of our capability of imitation and 
learning combined with our urge to spread genes, does not differ much from the large 
variety of tree branches. It is a means we acquired through evolution that enables us 
to cope with changing circumstances, that is within a generation.113 Genes cannot 
change that fast, so humans would not have been so successful in populating the 
earth without the ability to create culture. This implies that our physical blueprint 
probably is much the same as it was 30,000 years ago. As Eaton et al. put it, we are 
‘stone agers in the fast lane’,114 but if we are, then rather like stone agers that 
created an environment that fits them.115 As a consequence, cultural expressions like 
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architecture, instruments, art, books, and so on, take on lives of their own and 
become an integrated part of our environment.116 Even so, culture remains our 
creation and it was and is driven by our urge to spread our genes. 
The fact that replication is the most fundamental property of all forms of life 
logically means that every living organism will contribute to the replication of its genes 
in some way. In other words, every gene that has been around for, say, one million 
years has been successful in driving its bearer (Dawkins speaks of a ‘vehicle’117) to 
reproduction or at least survival. The ‘grand unifying theory’ Blackburn deems 
impossible118 probably can be found by studying biological drives. All of our urges, 
desires, wishes, values and duties can ultimately be connected to that one genetic 
property of replication. This does not alter people for the ‘worse’, as Blackburn 
fears,119 because the worse would mean that people’s actions would fundamentally 
be driven by the notion that treachery would in the long run enable their genes to 
spread faster. This, as I have argued, is incorrect. Human genes will spread fastest if 
people cooperate. Sociobiology, if interpreted accurately, need not be cynical at all. It 
is not because we can fight our heartless nature that we learn to have a heart, but 
because evolution has endowed us with feelings of sympathy for our fellow group 
members. What we feel as heartwarming is exactly the kind of behavior that will 
enhance group stability and cooperation, which in turn and at the same time will 
enhance the spreading of our genes. Self-love will get us nowhere, our love for our 
children, for our family, for our fellow group members will spread our genes 




From the perspective of evolutionary psychology it is clear that humans are driven to 
cooperation by the physical force of replication. We now can look for means that 
enhance cooperation. Spreading our genes is not generally considered a worthy 
cause that motivates us to cooperate. People do not think on that ultimate level. They 
think it is heartless, banal, coarse or depressing to think of sex as the goal of their 
lives. In addition, genes cannot be seen to spread and the best strategies are too 
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complicated to understand in a split second. But evolution has found a solution. 
People are psychologically driven by emotions, feelings and values that function as 
evolutionary calculators. On a proximate level people like wealth, health, food, sex, 
admiration, respect, freedom, unity, property, in a word all those things that will favor 
the spreading of their genes on an ultimate level. People ´just´ want happiness for 
themselves and their family. On a proximate level people will strive for cooperation 
because that will get them what they want and as a result they will find or increase 
their happiness. Of course, free riding on the efforts of group members remains an 
appealing strategy. If we let others work for us, we have more resources at our 
disposal, so that our genes can spread faster. That is, unless the others unmask us 
as cheaters and punish us. Then the free riding turns into a loss. We have formulated 
rules to share our earnings in a reciprocal way. Those who do not keep to the rules 
and take a free ride can be punished in our name by the authorities. Fehr and 
Gächter have shown that this principle is very strong.120 In experiments where people 
could not punish transgressors, cooperation went down. In experiments where 
people knew they could be punished, cooperation went up (see also Dunbar 
1999).121 The drive to punish free riders is probably as strong as the drive to 
cooperate.  
With evolution disposing us to trust each other, to cooperate and to punish 
free riders, how can we enhance cooperation further? We can do that by taking 
‘binding’ measures within the group. We will sing together, work together, perform 
rituals,122 adjust our ideas to group ideas,123 tell stories of virtuous people,124 conform 
to group incentives and group morals, feel guilt and shame if we do not,125 live up to 
group values, not break promises,126 discuss and acknowledge the right behavior in 
gossip,127 develop our own group dialect128 and/or wear clothes and use signs by 
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which we can recognize each other as fellow group members.129 This will make our 
group successful and the group will grow. The group will grow until our brains cannot 
cope with all those people anymore. According to Dunbar (2001), the maximum 
number of group members our brain can cope with is about 150.130 A group with 
more group members will normally fall apart into subgroups,131 unless we make rules 
that allow us to treat strangers as trustable group members. Using such rules we can 
organize a complex society whose authorities make sure that everyone abides by the 
same values.132 In large communities, where people do not know each other by 
name and do not know whether someone is a potential free rider, a binding device 
has evolved – we call it law. This structuring device enables people to specialize and 
in this way gain still more from cooperation.133 They can make advanced weapons to 
defend the group and expand their influence. They can make machines to produce 
more resources and food. They can develop healthcare so that fewer children will 
die. And so on. From a genetic perspective, the result is astonishing. Even though 
humans are relatively large mammals that need huge quantities of resources to 
spread, they have managed to be the most successful mammal on earth – from the 
genetic point of few. Since the introduction of law and government the human 
population has been growing like a colony of bacteria in a petri dish. The numbers 
speak for themselves. Our species numbers approximately seven billion, by far the 
highest number of mammals of comparable size on the planet; we are gradually, if 
haltingly, evolving into a global society. However, do we have the biological capacity 
to keep track with this new drastic change of our environment? 
 
Expanding the in-group 
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Our group has grown from small tribal communities into a more or less global society, 
thanks to the law that made it possible to trust strangers. Nevertheless, our genes 
have not changed much from when our ancestors lived as hunter-gatherers, some 
10,000 years ago. Hunter-gatherer groups were relatively small, but the agricultural 
revolution made possible large societies that were necessary for defensive purposes 
and for raising an army.134 We have retained most of the genes of our ancestors that 
lived in small groups all these thousands of years ago and so our emotions will tell us 
to be fearful of strangers, of people that are not like us.135 People that do not show 
our distinctive group marks will be treated as out-groupers.136 People that have 
another skin color, another dialect or language, other rituals, other beliefs, other 
values do not look like group members. We will consider them out-groupers and out-
groupers do no deserve to be treated as group members.137 They are a potential 
threat to group stability. Out-groupers will take our jobs, they will steal our precious 
property, they will parasitize on our wealth, they will rape our women, they will burn 
our cities. The great philosopher Aristotle, who set such great store by high values 
and was admired for adhering to them at all costs, considered women, slaves, non-
citizens and barbarians out-groupers.138 Even Thomas Jefferson, one of the founding 
fathers of the United States of America, owned slaves. The individual freedom the 
Constitution presupposes was never intended to apply to aliens.139 To arouse 
feelings of fear towards strangers is not particularly difficult.140 It is no coincidence 
that populists can stir up these sentiments so easily. It is no coincidence that this 
fear, once awakened, can escalate rather dramatically, as so many wars have 
evidenced. Killing outsiders even enhances in-group solidarity.141 
Is that the force of nature? Does nature drive us to war? Must we stand up to 
our nature? Many philosophers concluded that we need reason to counteract these 
destructive instincts. It seems as if man’s nature inevitably leads to a war of everyone 
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against everyone. Hobbes suggested that a sovereign could suppress the destructive 
nature of individuals; a sovereign would transcend human nature.142 Hobbes was 
wrong. Humans are more social than he expected and a sovereign is as susceptible 
to human urges as any of his subjects. A state also needs ‘checks and balances to 
prevent one group from predating upon others’.143 
Kant posited that reason, as some kind of dual force in our mind, can suppress 
our destructive instinct.144 Reason will tell us what to do. Coincidently, reason tells us 
to be reciprocal. Reason tells us, we have to act as we would wish everyone to act 
and to treat everyone as equals, as ends in themselves. Kant was wrong in the sense 
that there is no higher, dual, independent force in our mind. Even our conscious will 
is driven by unconscious emotions, feelings, memories, morals and deliberations.145 
Our mind is like an orchestra in which every instrument plays its role146 in the quest to 
spread underlying genes.  
It is therefore no coincidence that the Golden Rule – we should treat others as 
we would like them to treat us – is found in all ‘ethical’ systems, as Blackburn 
acknowledges.147 This rule originally only concerned our kin, as also can be read in 
Leviticus 19:18: ‘You shall not seek revenge, or cherish anger towards your kinsfolk; 
you shall love your neighbor as a man like yourself.’ Although ‘everything in the Law 
and the prophets hangs on’ this,148 it is biology that has driven us to this wisdom: no 
cooperation without reciprocity. Even at DNA level genes obey this law. A gene that 
would replicate freely within DNA would destroy it. That is why there are chemical 
mechanisms to prevent such behavior.  
We can discover these natural principles by reasoning. Although it looks as if 
our reasoning produces these laws, it was nature that produced the principle. The 
biological translation of the Golden Rule could well be something like this: Work to 
spread the genes of your group members, as you work to spread your own, so that 
eventually your offspring will survive. 
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We do not need an undefined faculty that will ‘save’ us from our destructive 
animal nature. It is the social animal itself that puts things into order. Nature has 
predisposed us to cooperate with strangers that become group members. Nature has 
created humans that are social animals that will cooperate with anyone they can 
trust.149 Nature has enabled us to overcome our fear of strangers.150 Nature has 
given us the talent to write down basic principles and to communicate how we can 
adjust to each other’s behavior. Nature has created the means for us to adjust quickly 
to different circumstances: our ability to imitate and learn. Nature has endowed us 
with the potential to create a culture and law that will unite people all over the world in 
a global society. In such a global society we can cope with global warming, all-out 
wars, food shortage and overpopulation so that our genes will survive for another 
million years.  
 
The paradox of relativism in a global society 
 
The principle of expanding the in-group is also the answer to the problem of 
relativism. What is good for the farmer need not be good for the tourist. A rainy day 
may be a boon for the farmer but it is the bane of the tourist.151 While rain helps crops 
grow and will enable the farmer to nourish his offspring, the tourist’s offspring may fall 
ill because of the nasty weather. The very thing that makes the farmer happy 
displeases the tourist. There is no absolute good. This qualification depends on 
context, circumstances and social position. For many Hutus in Rwanda it may have 
felt good to kill Tutsis: they gained more space to spread their genes. For many 
Americans, English and Dutch it may have felt good to exploit slaves. For Serbs it 
may have felt good to rape Muslim women in Bosnia. For the Americans that lynched 
an African-American it may have felt good to be part of the group. Photos of lynching 
parties show proud white people.152  
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Figure 1: 28 September 1919, lynching of William Brown in Douglas County, 
Nebraska.153 
 
To the Nazis it seemed a good idea to create more Lebensraum and conquer 
Europe. It only turned out to be a bad idea because the allied forces in the end 
proved to be stronger. For men it can be good to compete and let their wives 
‘produce’ as much offspring as possible. Respecting the morals of other cultures can 
have disastrous effects. In an international context it is hard to justify these cultural 
perspectives.154 Morals originally and initially apply only to group members: we need 
only love our neighbor. Group morals only have value within the group. In this sense, 
they are relative. However, when the group expands to all people in the world, our 
former enemy turns out to be just another neighbor.155 We have to treat our former 
enemy as our neighbor, that is we must deal with him as if he is our brother. As in-
group expands in a global society to all people in the world, eventually we have to 
treat all people as group members. Group norms must become global norms and 
must apply to all human beings without distinction. Group values must become 
universal values.  
This tendency of expanding the in-group and universalizing values according 
our biological drives has been going on for a few thousands years now. The need for 
a universal consensus on the balance between individual and society has made 
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people subsequently expanding the in-group.156 If we treat all people as if they were 
our brothers and sisters, as valued group members, our values, morals and rules will 
turn out to be fitting for a global society. The current and ongoing formation of a 
global society ultimately seems to be a natural process that will enhance the survival 
chances of our genes.157 If we continue to treat each other as out-groupers, the 
external problems will become too big to solve. To treat all people as ‘ends in 
themselves’158  turns out to be an innate drive as well. However, we need 
cooperation within large groups to specialize and find the means to cope with world 
threatening problems,159 that in turn are threats to the spreading of our genes. 
Although morals, values, and laws are relative and depend on the environment 
in which they function, in a globalizing society the success of our genes depends on 
global cooperation. As cooperation can be enhanced by group norms, global 
cooperation can be enhanced by global principles: principles that will ensure the 
safety and survival of people, that will help us find answers to the global problems we 
face nowadays, that will help us overcome the tragedy of the commons on a global 
scale, so that our genes will survive. These principles can be found in human nature 
by considering all people our brothers, as I will try to show in the finishing part of this 
article. 
 
The four Biological Principles of Global Ethics 
 
If we overcome dichotomies in contemporary ethics, by applying evolutionary 
psychology, we can formulate some basic laws that should apply in future global 
ethics. These laws can be derived from our very biological nature. First we need to 
determine the ultimate common drive that we as human beings cannot escape. As is 
generally accepted in biology the most fundamental drive of all life is to spread our 
genes. When we expand our in-group to people around the world, we must respect 
the urge to reproduce in all people as well as our own biological urge. From this 
follows that the First Biological Principle of Global Ethics must be: 
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Human beings have an innate drive to fill the earth with their genes and are 
fundamentally free to act in accordance with this drive. 
 
As from the evolutionary perspective religion is a means to enhance 
cooperation, equivalents of this first biological principle can be found in the moral 
systems of religion. For example ‘Be fruitful and increase, fill the earth and subdue 
it’,160 fertility rituals all over the world and the first signs of human beliefs such as 
Willendorf’s Venus or Kostjenki’s Venus. Equivalents can also be found in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example Article 16: ‘Men and women of 
full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to 
marry and to found a family’.161 
 
 Figure 2: Kostjenki’s Venus162  
 
However, unlimited freedom to procreate will lead to catastrophe. Humans 
have come to conquer the world because they were able to reciprocate. Humans are 
by nature social animals and thus their freedom is inherently limited. They have to 
cooperate in order to be successful. Knowing ourselves, we are aware that we need 
to know our limits. The Second Biological principle of Global Ethics must therefore 
be: 
 
Human beings are innately predisposed to cooperate (within groups) and have the 
fundamental duty to act reciprocally.  
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Equivalents of this second biological principle can also be found in the social 
and moral systems of religions, for example ‘Love your neighbor as yourself’,163 ‘Do 
for one who may do for you, that you may cause him thus to do’ in the ancient (1,800 
BC) Egyptian Tale of the Eloquent Peasant164  and ‘This is the sum of duty: do not do 
to others what would cause pain if done to you’ in the Hindu Mahabharata (5:1517). 
Confucius stated: ‘What then will you return for good? Recompense injury with 
justice, and return good for good’.165 Other equivalents can be found in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: ‘Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to 
equal pay for equal work’ (Article 23). In addition, the biological principle of reciprocity 
can be recognized in all forms of contract law, if not in all law. 
 
The third principle can also be derived from nature. We can abide by the first 
two principles and suffer great losses notwithstanding, because we are predisposed 
to mistrust strangers. Strangers can be out-groupers that may pose a threat to our 
very lives. Our brains evolved at a time when living in groups of about 150 members 
offered a major evolutionary advantage. Now that we have succeeded in occupying 
the entire planet, we must prolong this evolutionary success by treating former 
enemies as group members. The primeval human ability to include and integrate 
strangers in our in-groups can be applied to expand the in-group. Expanding the in-
group is necessary to ensure that people will not harm people that look different, as 
in doing so we would eventually harm ourselves. The Third Biological Principle of 
Global Ethics can be formulated as follows: 
 
All human beings without distinction belong to the same group and must be treated 
accordingly. 
 
Again equivalents can be found in religion, such as in the Christian parable of 
the Good Samaritan: ‘“Which of these three do you think was neighbor to the man 
who fell into the hand who fell into the hands of the robbers?” He answered, “The one 
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who showed him kindness.” Jesus said, “Go and do as he did”’.166 Although this 
parable has no true religious equivalents, Mohammed teaches thus: ‘It may be that 
God will ordain love between you and those whom you hold as enemies.’167 It is 
probably Buddhism that takes this tenet furthest, because it expands the in-group to 
all organisms that can feel anything: ‘I should be like the sun, shining universally on 
all without seeking thanks or reward, able to take care of all sentient beings even if 
they are bad, never giving up on my vows on this account, not abandoning all 
sentient beings because one sentient being is evil’.168 The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights voices the third biological principle in Article 2: 
 
‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, 
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person 
belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any 
other limitation of sovereignty.’ 
 
What is still missing is an essential prescription that is necessary to preserve 
the existence of our genes in a globalized world. If we cooperate and work together 
without distinction the tragedy of the commons predicts that we will end up with 
exhausted resources. This will have catastrophic consequences for us and our 
offspring. People can only spread their genes if there are enough nutrients. 
Obviously, in a world of plenty unbridled growth is an effective way to spread our 
genes, but in a world of globalization and depletion of natural resources a rapid 
expansion of the in-group to include in some sense all of our resources is 
indispensable if we want to reach a new equilibrium. Global principles will have to 
steer growth.169 That is why a Fourth Biological principle of Global Ethics must be 
introduced: 
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All human beings are dependent on sufficient resources and must restrict their needs 
in a way that will not exhaust these resources. 
 
Although this rule has only gained prominence quite recently, early equivalents 
can be found in religions. In Christianity, stewardship is an ethic that embodies 
responsible management of resources.170 It is derived from texts like Genesis 1:29: ‘I 
give you all plants that bear seed: they shall be yours for food.’ The Aboriginal moral 
system is more explicit on stewardship. Put simply, significant species and places, 
natural phenomena and spirit ancestors were also included in the moral system and 
were therefore considered to be one’s self, brother, sister, mother, grandmother, 
etc..171 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not reflect this important 
biological principle. Many human rights are recognized, but the Declaration falls short 
in terms of protecting our resources for future needs. It is essential that this 
deficiency be remedied in a global society, because our children and grandchildren 




Although Blackburn believes there cannot be a grand unifying theory or a single 
driving force that underlies ethics, this article suggests that the spreading of our 
genes may well be the key. Biological facts can be transformed into normative 
thinking by using evolutionary psychological theories and facts of cooperation. As 
cooperation is the means by which humans have successfully spread their genes, 
ethics in some sense can be regarded as a biological force and even as a physical 
force. By acknowledging this, dichotomies in contemporary ethics can be overcome, 
allowing four biological principles of global ethics to be formulated on the basis of 
factual biological mechanisms. 
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